We consider a variation of the traditional single-leg, multi-period revenue management problem in which consumers act strategically and bid for units of a fixed capacity over time. Buyers compete directly against each other within a period as in a traditional auction and indirectly with bidders in other periods through the opportunity cost of capacity assessed by the seller. The number of bidders in each period, as well as the individual bidders' valuations, are random. For this setting, we prove that dynamic variants of the first-price and second-price auction mechanisms maximize the seller's expected revenue. We also show explicitly how to compute and implement these optimal mechanisms.
Introduction
Revenue management traditionally involves segmenting customers, setting prices and controlling capacity to maximize the revenue generated from a fixed capacity. See McGill and van Ryzin [13] for a review. However, especially with the rise of the Internet, many industries have lately begun experimenting with alternative pricing mechanisms, such as auctions, guaranteed purchase contracts, group purchasing, etc. (See van Ryzin [22] .) Given the capabilities that on-line channels provide, such innovations are not surprising. But they do raise some important theoretical and practical questions. In particular, exactly which mechanisms should be used to maximize revenue in any given context? How should an optimal mechanism be designed and operated? And how much benefit (if any) can be obtained from a better mechanism?
We make some initial progress in addressing these questions. Specifically, we consider a natural variation of the traditional single-leg, multi-period revenue management problem (e.g. see Brumelle and McGill [3] ) in which buyers bid strategically in each period for a limited supply of capacity. The assumption that buyers act strategically is in contrast to traditional revenue management models, where demand is independent of any decisions made by the seller and buyers do not act strategically.
Our model instead closely follows the assumptions of classical auction theory as described in the seminal work of Vickrey [23] , the influential paper of Milgrom and Weber [15] , the recent survey by Klemperer [9] and earlier survey articles: McAfee and McMillan [12] , Milgrom [14] , Rothkopf and Harstad [19] , Matthews [11] and Wolfstetter [24] . As in this auction literature, we assume buyers have private valuations for a unit of capacity, and they act strategically to maximize their utility (i.e. their value minus the price they pay). As a result, a buyer's behavior is dependent on both the pricing and allocation mechanism selected by the seller and by other buyers' strategies.
To our knowledge, few papers have addressed the link between revenue management and auctions: Cooper and Menich [4] proposed a generalization of the Vickrey auction to sell airline tickets for a network of flights. However, this work does not capture the dynamic decision making feature of our problem. Eso [7] worked on an iterative sealed bid auction for excess seat capacity for an airline, where bidders get instant feedback, including minimum bid suggestions for declined bids.
She modeled every iteration as a multi-unit combinatorial auction (see de Vries and Vohra [5] for a survey on this topic).
Motivated by Internet auctions, Segev et.al. [20] deal with a problem similar to ours in which an auctioneer tries to sell multiple units of a product using a multi-period auction. The key difference is that customer bids are exogenous in their model. Specifically, they propose a Markov chain to model bidder behavior. Thus, their analysis does not consider the strategic behavior of buyers and does not employ game theory to endogenize bidder behavior, as we do in our work. Another difference is that Segev et.al. [20] assume the seller precommits to the number of units to award in each period. We do not impose this restriction, and indeed show below that precommiting is suboptimal and that the seller is better off observing the bids first and then deciding how many units to award based on the bid values she receives.
Our model is closer in its assumptions to traditional auction theory. However, it differs from traditional auction theory in that the seller receives bids over time. In particular, we assume there are T periods and in each period t, a new set of buyers bids for the remaining capacity. The seller must determine winners in period t before observing the bids (or even the number of bidders) in future periods. This dynamic feature parallels the traditional revenue management model, in which the seller must determine the capacity to sell in a given period before observing demand in future periods.
For this model, we adapt results on optimal auctions from Maskin and Riley [10] to show that dynamic versions of the first-price and second-price auction mechanisms maximize expected revenues for the seller. However, the optimal mechanisms are somewhat more complex than in the traditional auction setting. In particular, in the first-price case, the seller solicits bids, sorts them, infers the bidders' valuations v from the bids (which we show can indeed be done) and then computes what Myerson [16] calls the bidder's "virtual value", defined by J(v) = v − 1/ρ(v), where v is the bidder's valuation and ρ(v) is the hazard rate of the distribution of bidders' valuations.
The seller then accepts a bid if its virtual value exceeds the expected marginal cost of capacity (see Section 3 for a precise definition of the mechanism). In the second-price case, if the seller chooses to award k, the winners pay the maximum of the (k + 1) th highest bid and a threshold price that depends on k and the optimal value function. Under this mechanism, we show it is a dominant strategy for bidders to bid their values v -again bids are accepted if their virtual value exceeds the expected marginal cost of capacity.
What is unusual from a revenue management perspective about these mechanisms that we develop here -but quite natural to auction theorists -is that it can be optimal for the seller to reject a bid even though its revenue strictly exceeds the expected marginal value of capacity.
That is, an optimal mechanism, in some cases, will refuse bids that would be strictly profitable if accepted. The reason is that, just as in setting a reserve price in a classical auction, rejecting profitable bids ex post is necessary to induce buyers to submit higher equilibrium bids ex ante.
The expected gains in revenue from these higher equilibrium bids more than compensate for the losses in revenue incurred in cases where profitable bids are rejected. Exactly which bids should be selected and which rejected to induce the revenue-maximizing bidding behavior is given precisely by our analysis. In addition to showing theoretically that modified first-price and second-price mechanisms are optimal, we provide an efficient method to compute the optimal selling mechanism in each case.
We then compare the optimal mechanism to a stylized version of a traditional revenue management settings, which we call a list price, capacity-controlled mechanism -or LPCC for short. The LPCC mechanism sets a fixed, take-it-or-leave-it price in each period together with a limit on the number of units of capacity that can be sold at the list price. The LPCC is equivalent to the static revenue management model, such as the one analyzed by Brumelle and McGill [3] , but with prices as well as capacity controls optimized. For this mechanism, it is a dominant strategy for buyers to attempt to buy if the list price is less than their valuation. As a result, buyers' strategic behavior under LPCC coincides with the assumptions of the traditional revenue management model.
We show theoretically that the LPCC mechanism is in fact optimal when there is at most one buyer in each period -or asymptotically as the number of bidders and units to be sold grows large. Our numerical results show that LPCC revenues decrease relative to the optimal mechanism when the number of bidders per period increases (i.e., there is more "aggregation" of buyers) and when the product is relatively scarce. Moreover, this difference grows larger if the variability in buyers' valuations or in the number of bidders per period increases. These results suggest that some aggregation of buyers is necessary to achieve a benefit from using an auction mechanism for revenue management, and that scarcity and more variation in willingness to pay will help as well.
Such conclusions are roughly consistent with pricing mechanisms observed in various industries.
Indeed, list pricing is typically used for products that are purchased infrequently over extended periods of time and have somewhat low variance in valuation -or products that are purchased in large volumes (e.g. retail purchases of common consumer goods), whereas auctions are typically employed for items that are sold in low volumes and are sold during a single event to a pool of potential buyers who have, plausibly, a high variability in their valuations (real estate, art, bonds).
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: In Section 2 we introduce notation from the auction literature and formulate the dynamic program for our model. In Section 3 we present theoretical properties of the revenue function and describe the optimal mechanism under both first-price and second-price auction frameworks. Section 4 describes the LPCC mechanism. Some numerical results are presented in Section 5, and our conclusions are given in Section 6.
Model Formulation

Notation
We begin by introducing some notation. All vectors are assumed to be in R n + unless otherwise specified. v j denotes the j th component of vector v, and v −j ≡ (v 1 , . . . , v j−1 , v j+1 , . . . , v n ) is the vector of components other than j. Subscripts between parentheses stand for reverse order statistics; that is, for any vector v, v (1) 
I{·} denotes the indicator function, and A \ B the set difference between A and B. LHS and RHS are shorthands for left hand side and right hand side respectively. A function is said to be increasing (decreasing) when it is non-decreasing (non-increasing).
Description of the model
A seller has an initial inventory of C units of a good that she wants to sell over a finite time horizon T . She does this by conducting a sequence of auctions, indexed by t = T, T − 1, . . . , 1. The time index is assumed to run backwards, and smaller values of t represent later points in time.
In period t, N t risk neutral potential buyers (bidders) arrive. N t is a non-negative, discretevalued random variable, distributed according to a known probability mass function g(·) with support [0, M] for some M > 0, and strictly positive first moment. We will assume that buyers do not select their time of arrival, and that they participate in only one auction period. That is, we do not model the fact that buyers may adjust their time of arrival and bidding behavior in subsequent auction periods depending on the seller's behavior. While it would be a desirable extension -and perhaps more realistic -to allow buyers to choose periods (or to bid in more than one period), this assumption is quite consistent with the current models in the revenue management literature and leads to a tractable problem formulation.
Each buyer wishes to purchase at most one unit and has a reservation value v t i , 1 ≤ i ≤ N t , which represents the maximum amount buyer i is willing to pay for the object. When the context is clear, we will drop the time index and write v i . Reservation values are private information, independent and identically distributed draws from a distribution F (·), which is strictly increasing with a continuous density function f (·) on the support [v, v] , with F (v) = 0 and F (v) = 1.
Without loss of generality, assume v = 0 throughout. We will use v both for the random vector of valuations (from the seller's perspective), and for its realization, where the meaning should be clear from the context. To simplify notation and subsequent analysis we restrict attention to distribution functions g and F that do not depend on the time t. The extension to time dependent distributions is straightforward. The distributions F and g are assumed common knowledge to the seller and all potential buyers. In addition, each buyer i knows his own (private) valuation v i . Without loss of generality we assume that the unit salvage value for the seller at time t = 0 is v 0 = 0. The seller's problem is to design an auction mechanism that maximizes her expected revenue.
The auctioneer will specify a set of rules (the mechanism) according to which the auction will be conducted. These rules may depend on the time t and the remaining inventory at the beginning of each period, denoted by x. Each bidder based on his private valuation, his knowledge of the distribution functions F, g, and the set of rules established by the auctioneer, chooses his bid (or strategy) in order to maximize his expected utility. Then, the auctioneer observes the set of submitted bids and applies the rules specified earlier to decide the number of units to award in period t and the payments to be made by the various bidders. Before proceeding, we briefly review some results on optimal auction design that are used in our analysis.
Results from the theory of optimal auctions
The basic results on optimal auctions that we use are from Myerson [16] and Maskin and Riley [10] .
The first paper gives the mathematical formulation of optimal auction design for a single good, and the second extends some of these results to the multi-unit setting.
Consider an auction in which we are selling one or more homogeneous objects to n buyers. Each buyer i wants at most one of the objects, which he values at v i . As mentioned above, the values v i are private information, but it is common knowledge that v i 's are iid with distribution F .
A strategy for buyer i is a function s i (v i ) that specifies a bid that buyer i will submit given his valuation v i . We let s(v) = (s 1 (v 1 ), ..., s n (v n )) denote the vector of bidding strategies used by the n buyers. An auction mechanism is specified by a pair of mappingsq : R n + → {0, 1} n andỹ : R n + → R n + that define, respectively, the allocation of goods and payments made by the bidders as a function of their bids. The auction mechanism is chosen by the seller and is common knowledge. Suppose bidder i chooses a strategy
) is the allocation of goods to bidder i, which is equal to 1 if he is awarded a unit, and 0 otherwise. Given his bid, s i (v i ), the probability that bidder i is awarded a unit is given by 
. When the number of players n is random, each player computes his optimal action by conditioning both on the values of the other players and the total number of players in the game.
Bidders are assumed to be rational and therefore bidder i chooses his strategy
Assuming that buyers choose their strategies without collusion, they play a noncooperative game of incomplete information. The appropriate solution concept in this context is that of a Bayesian equilibrium of Harsanyi [8] , an extension of the ordinary Nash equilibrium [17] . Buyer i behaves according to a function s * i (·) which for each possible type v i assigns a strategy s * i (v i ). With buyers acting non-cooperatively, a vector of strategy rules (s * 1 (·), . . . , s * n (·)) is an equilibrium if, for all i, buyer i's best response is to conform to strategy s * i (·) provided all other buyers conform to their strategies s * −i (·). In what follows, we shall restrict ourselves to only symmetric strategies; that is, strategies for which the equilibrium strategy s * i (·) is the same for all i. 2 The optimal mechanism is one that results in an equilibrium that maximizes the expected seller revenues. Analytically, this amounts to finding the "best" allocation and payment functionsq,ỹ for the seller.
This mechanism design problem can be simplified considerably using the analysis of Maskin and Riley [10] . For any equilibrium strategy s * , we can define the mechanism q, y in terms of the values v as follows
If the auctioneer were to use the rules q, y in place ofq,ỹ and s * was indeed an equilibrium, then each bidder's equilibrium strategy would be to reveal his true value, because this corresponds to playing according to s * in the original setting. Suppressing the dependence on s * in the bidder profit functions Π i (i.e., writing
, the latter translates into the incentive-compatibility constraint Π i (v i , v i ) = max z Π(z, v i ). In addition, since the seller cannot force the bidders to participate in the auction, he must guarantee that they have non-negative expected surplus. This participation constraint is expressed as Π i (0, 0) ≥ 0.
It is relatively easy to verify thatq,ỹ is equivalent to q, y in terms of allocations and expected payments. This equivalence is referred to as the revelation principle, and q, y is called a direct revelation mechanism; see Myerson [16] . Hence, the problem of optimizing over all possible auction mechanismsq,ỹ can be reduced to one of searching over all direct revelation mechanisms q, y subject 1 For example, consider a single-unit first-price auction, where the good is awarded to the highest bidder who pays the auctioneer the value of his bid; all other bidders pay nothing. Then, if v i = v (1) (i.e., i is the highest bidder and
2 In a single-unit first-price auction, the unique symmetric equilibrium is given by s
, where v0 is the reservation value of the seller; see Riley and Samuelson [18] . We have not been able to establish the uniqueness of symmetric equilibria in our case, so symmetry remains an assumption of the model.
to the incentive compatibility and participation constraints.
Extending earlier results from single-unit auctions, Maskin and Riley [10] showed the rather remarkable fact that the expected seller's revenue can be expressed only in terms of the allocation 
where
,
is the hazard rate function associated with the distribution F . From this fact, it follows that all mechanisms that result in the same allocations q for each realization of v yield the same expected revenue. This is the so called revenue equivalence theorem.
For example, in a standard k unit auction, one can show that both the first-price and secondprice auctions award the goods to the bidders with the k highest valuations. Thus, the allocation q(v) is the same for each v and hence the two mechanisms generate the same expected revenue for the seller. This is true despite the fact that the bidding strategies and payments in each case are quite different.
Moreover, expression (1) can be used to design an optimal mechanism by simply choosing the allocation rule q * (v) that maximizes
) subject to any constraints one might have on the allocation (e.g., we have k items to sell so we may require that the allocation q satisfies
In optimal auction problems, it is useful to make the following regularity assumption on the distribution function F :
This assumption holds when the hazard rate either increases or does not decline too fast with v (formally speaking, we require
, and is satisfied by most standard distributions, including, for example, the uniform and the exponential. If we define
(and by convention, v * = ∞ if J(v) < 0, ∀v), then from (1) it follows that it is never optimal to allocate a unit to a buyer with valuation v i < v * . This simple observation is the basis for determining optimal reserve prices.
The trick in applying this approach to auction design is to find an implementable mechanism that in fact produces the optimal allocation q * (v). This requires a separate analysis. Thus, the analysis proceeds in two steps: 1) Find an optimal allocation q * (v); then, 2) Find an implementable mechanism that produces q * (v) for each realization v. For example, consider a standard k unit auction with a second-price mechanism and reserve price v * . One can show in this case that bidders bid their true values v i and the items are awarded up to the k highest bidders with valuations above v * , which in fact produces the allocation q * (v) that maximizes (1) subject to the constraint that at most k items can be awarded.
Dynamic programming formulation
We next apply these optimal auction results to our dynamic revenue optimization problem. In each period t, the seller must choose an auction mechanism that maximizes her total expected revenues.
Recall that C denotes the initial inventory of goods to sell. Define the value function V t (x) as the maximum expected revenue obtainable from periods t, t − 1, . . . , 1 given that there are x units remaining at time t.
As described above, we first define the optimal auction mechanism in terms of the allocation rule q(v) used in each period. We then analyze implementable mechanisms that achieve this allocation as part of a separate analysis below. Using (1), the Bellman equation (see Bertsekas [2] ) for
with boundary conditions
The problem is to choose for each period t an allocation q(·) that maximizes V T (C).
Analysis of the optimal dynamic allocations and mechanisms
We first analyze the theoretical properties of the dynamic program (3)- (4), and then use the structure of the associated optimal allocation policy to define two incentive compatible mechanisms that achieve the optimal allocation. These mechanisms are variants of the classic first and second-price auctions.
Theoretical properties
The solution of the dynamic program (3)-(4) depends crucially on the structural properties of the marginal value of capacity, defined by
. Namely, we will show that
First, we begin by reformulating the dynamic program. Define:
Note that
and that the integrality constraints can be relaxed to 0 ≤ q i ≤ 1. Formulation (3) can therefore be rewritten in terms of p as follows:
subject to (4). Let p * (x) be the optimal number of bids to accept at time t with inventory position
where the sum is defined to be 0 if p = 0.
Let n t denote any realization of the random variable N t , and v be a realization of bidders' types.
The following lemma shows that the optimal allocation in each period is rather simple provided (6) is also decreasing in p, and p * (x) is the largest p for which this difference is positive. 2
Note that since V t (x) is increasing in x (this can be shown easily), it is always true that
We also require the following Lemma, which states that under the same conditions on ∆V t−1 (x), if we have one more unit available to sell, we allocate at most one more unit to the buyers. This property is helpful both theoretically and computationally (see the Appendix for a proof).
The following theorem establishes that the marginal value of capacity, ∆V t (x), is indeed decreasing (see the Appendix for a proof):
Theorem 1 and Lemma 1 show how the seller should run the auction -provided she can infer the values v i of the bidders. In particular, note that ∆R(i) = J(v (i) ) for i = 1, .., min{x, N t }, so the decision rule in Lemma 1 about the optimal number of bids to accept is simply based on sorting the values v i and progressively awarding items to the highest value bidders until J(v (i) ) drops below the marginal opportunity cost ∆V t−1 (x − i + 1). Thus, given the bidder's values v i and the value function V t−1 (x), the optimal allocation rule is quite simple. One can compute the value function V t (x) efficiently using simulation as discussed below.
Finally, it is also useful to know how the expected marginal revenue for a fixed number of remaining units varies with time. The next theorem confirms that the optimal solution has the natural property that the more time remaining, the higher the marginal value of each unit of capacity. (The proof is in the Appendix.)
Theorem 2 ∆V t (x) is increasing in t.
Computing the optimal solution
In order to compute the function V t (x), one can use Monte Carlo simulation. This works as follows:
For each period t, generate m samples of the number of bidders and their valuations, where m is a parameter of the simulation. For each instance and for each pair of values (x, t), calculate p *
Mechanism design
The next step in our analysis of the problem is to construct auction mechanisms that implement the optimal allocation policy derived above. This mechanism must satisfy the incentive compatibility and participation constraints, while enforcing the allocation rule described in Lemma 1. The main result of this section is to demonstrate that appropriately modified versions of two standard procedures -the first and the second-price auctions -achieve this objective.
Second-price auction
In a traditional single-unit, ascending price auction, the auctioneer seeks increasing bids, starting from a minimum price, until all but the highest bidder have been eliminated. The winner pays the price of the second highest bid. It is easy to check that the dominant strategy for a buyer in this case is to bid his true value, or quit from the beginning if it is less than the reserve price. This procedure is also equivalent to the sealed-bid, second-price -or Vickrey -auction. A similar result is true in a traditional, k-unit auction where all k winners pay the (k + 1) th highest bid.
However, if one uses a straightforward application of the second-price mechanism in our setting, it is no longer optimal for buyers to bid their valuation. The following informal reasoning shows why: Suppose it is optimal to bid truthfully under the second-price mechanism and let
The thresholdsv i are directly computable from the solution of (3) described in the previous section, which uses common knowledge information, and are in principle known to all buyers and the seller.
Following Lemma 1, the seller will accept bid v (i) as long as v (i) >v i . Now suppose the seller decides to award k items. However, if the first looser, v (k+1) , had bidv k+1 + ε, the seller would include this bidder among the winners, award k + 1 items and the bidder would only pay v (k+2)
and make a positive profit. Hence, bidders have some incentive to "shade" their bids and a pure second-price mechanism fails to elicit truthful bids.
However, the following modified second-price mechanism avoids this pitfall: In each period t, the seller first computes the thresholdsv i using the current inventory x. Given the vector of submitted bids, b, the seller will award k items, where
and k = 0 if b (1) ≤v 1 ; and all winners will pay
where b (k+1) is the (k + 1) th highest bid andv k is the threshold to award the k th unit. Ties between bids are broken by randomization. Using (8)- (9), one can define the corresponding allocation and payment functionsq,ỹ; i.e., given k,q( (8) is a function of t, x, and thus so areq,ỹ. For simplicity we will refer to this mechanism through (8)- (9) .
Proposition 1 In the modified second-price auction with allocation and payments given by (8)- (9), the buyers' dominant strategy is to bid their own values.
Proof. When t = 1, ∆V t−1 (x − k + 1) = 0 and J −1 (0) = v * . In other words, in the last period a standard second-price auction takes place and therefore, bidding one's own value is a dominant strategy for buyers.
For t ≥ 2, the seller will observe the vector of bids and compute the number of units to award through (8) . Take a player i with value v i . We will show that he has no incentive to bidb i = v i .
There are two possible cases. The mechanism (8)- (9) is easily seen to be incentive compatible, since bidding ones value is a dominant strategy and therefore buyers have no incentive to disguise their type. It is also easy to verify that the participation constraint is satisfied since no buyers ever pay more than their value.
Hence, (8)- (9) is a direct revelation mechanism. Also, note thatv k is increasing in k. Therefore, as the number of units awarded by the seller increases, the price that the winners pay can increase. This is in sharp contrast to the traditional second-price mechanism in which the price winners pay always decreases as more units are awarded.
Finally, observe that when T = 1 our problem reduces to a single-period, multi-unit auction, which was reviewed in Section 2.3: Since the salvage value of unsold units at t = 0 is zero, the thresholdsv i are all equal to v * defined in (2) , and the mechanism is indeed identical to the one described for the single period auction.
First-price auction
In a first-price auction, items are awarded to the highest bidders and winners pay their bids. This type of mechanism may be more natural in certain applications.
To establish that the first-price auction achieves the same expected revenue as the second-price mechanism described above, one needs to show that: (a) items are again awarded according to the optimal allocation rule derived in the previous section, and that (b) bidders with zero value have zero expected surplus. To do this, it suffices to show that there exists a symmetric equilibrium bidding strategy B(·) that is strictly increasing in the bidder's value. In this case, the seller can use this bid function to invert a bid and infer the bidder's value, which she can then use to correctly compute the number of items to award.
The setup of the first-price auction is the following: The bidders are informed of the time t, the remaining inventory x, and the following allocation rule used by the seller: given a vector of bids b, the seller will award k items, where k = max{i ≥ 1 :
Here, B(·) is the equilibrium bid function, which we show below can be computed by the seller.
The items are awarded to the highest bidders, and winners pay their bids.
Our main result is the following (the proof is in the Appendix):
Proposition 2 The first-price auction has a symmetric, equilibrium, strictly increasing, bidding strategy b i = B(v i ). The strategy B depends on the current values of t and x as given bŷ
where P (v) is the probability that a bidder with value v is among the winners,
and p * (v) = max{0 ≤ i ≤ min{x, N t } : v >v i }, and by convention,v 0 < 0.
Note that (10) It is interesting to note that this first-price mechanism is not greedy, in the sense that it does not maximize the sum of observable revenue in the current period plus the expected revenue-togo, because the seller compares the values of J(v i )'s to the marginal value ∆V t (·), rather than the bids themselves. As a result, the seller may (a) accept bids below the marginal value when
, and (b) reject bids that are above marginal value when
Our numerical experiments show that both cases may occur.
In summary, given a set of bids, the seller using a first-price mechanism can implement the optimal allocation policy as defined by the dynamic program (3)-(4) by computing and inverting the buyers' equilibrium strategies. Of course, the implementation of the allocation rule is more complex than in the second-price case and the bidding problem faced by buyers is considerably more complex as well, so one could reasonably question the practicality of this mechanism. Still, the general characteristics -that bidders will shade their values in the first-price mechanism and that the seller should allocate based on whether or not the virtual value J(v) exceeds the marginal cost of capacity not whether the bid itself exceeds the marginal cost -provide insights into managing a first-price auction.
A suboptimal revenue management mechanism
We next consider a suboptimal mechanism that roughly corresponds to a traditional revenue management mechanism in which the seller sets a list price in each period but limits the number of units she is willing to sell (i.e. enforces capacity-controls for the availability of each price). We will compare the performance of this suboptimal mechanism to the optimal one in the next section.
We call this mechanism the list-price, capacity-controlled mechanism (LPCC). Under LPCC, the seller sets a take-it-or-leave-it price at the beginning of each period, and calculates a threshold on the number of units she is willing to award at the list price. Both prices and capacity controls are set optimally. Buyers who are interested in acquiring one unit at that list price submit "acceptances" (i.e. an offer to buy). If the number of acceptances exceeds the capacity limit set by the seller, the units are randomly rationed to the buyers. It is easy to see in this case that a dominant strategy for the buyers is to submit an "acceptance" if and only if their own value exceeds the seller's reserve price.
Analysis of LPCC
Let V LP CC t (x) denote the seller's expected revenue starting with x units of inventory in period t under LPCC. Let s denote the reserve price set by the seller in period t, and
be the random variable representing the number of buyers with valuations exceeding the reserve price s. In the last period (t = 1), the seller wants to solve
That is, the seller optimizes over the reserve price and the number of units to award. When t = 1, the function between brackets is clearly increasing in k, so it can be rewritten just in terms of s as
For periods t = 2, . . . , T , the DP formulation becomes
Note that if at some state (x, t) the optimal allocation is k * = 0, the reserve price will not matter. To keep things consistent, however, we will assume that s ≥ v to discourage buyers from submitting acceptances. (The next subsection describes the numerical solution of this dynamic program.)
We next show that the LPCC mechanism is in fact optimal (a) when there is at most one bidder per period, (b) when there are more units to sell than potential buyers, and (c) asymptotically as the number of bidders and units to sell grows large (C, N t ↑ ∞). This shows that unless buyers can be aggregated in time and there is some scarcity of the goods, there is no advantage to using a bidding mechanism over simple list pricing.
The next proposition considers the first of these three cases (see the Appendix for a proof):
. That is, the LPCC mechanism maximizes the seller's expected revenue.
This shows in particular that having isolated bidders submit offers to buy has no inherent advantage over list pricing. One needs to have more than one buyer bidding at a time to generate a benefit from an auction mechanism.
Our next proposition shows that if there are always more bidders than units of capacity, LPCC is again optimal:
The proof of this is relatively straightforward and we only outline the argument. First, note that LPCC is optimal if there is only one auction period (T = 1) and there are more items than bidders, i.e. C ≥ N 1 (with probability one). To see this, assume a generic price s posted by the seller. The revenue she will extract from each bidder is s(1 − F (s)) because buyer i will buy if his value v i > s and all such buyers will receive a unit, because there is no capacity constraint. The first order condition for the optimal price s * is then
But the solution s * is exactly the minimum acceptable bid found for a standard auction in (2) .
Moreover, this is also the price that the winners will pay under the optimal second-price mechanism when C ≥ N 1 . The same argument extends to the multi-period setting provided that C ≥ t N t (with probability one) so that the capacity constraint is never binding in any period.
Proposition 4 shows that an optimal mechanism has no advantage over list pricing if capacity is always unconstrained. Thus, some scarcity of the product or service is necessary to realize a gain over list pricing.
Third and finally, we show that LPCC becomes optimal as the number of bidders and number of units to be sold increases. That is, when the volume of sales is large. To see this we will analyze a k-unit, single-period, second-price auction in an appropriate limiting regime (k, N t ↑ ∞). Broadly speaking, as the number of players increases, the bid realization becomes an accurate and dense sample of the value distribution F . As a result, the order statistics, which determine the winning set and price to be paid, will correspond to appropriate fractiles of this distribution. This makes the seller's revenue a deterministic function of the number of units to be sold k and of the minimum reserve price v * . In the dynamic setting this gives rise to a deterministic control problem, where the auctioneer chooses the allocation of units per auction period in order to optimize overall revenue. This is an LPCC rule.
In more detail, in order to study the asymptotic behavior of a multi-unit auction we will consider a sequence of single-period auctions indexed by n, where the number of units to be sold is k n , the number of bidders is given by N n , and for some 0 < k ≤ N ,
If N n is random, we will assume that N n /n goes to a deterministic limit almost surely; which implies that the coefficient of variation of N n approaches zero sufficiently fast.
Recall that v * = max{v ≥ v : J(v) = 0}, and that under a second-price mechanism the bidders' dominant strategy is to bid their values independent of the number of items k n and the number of bidders N n . Therefore, for any realization v, the seller will award x k n ,N n (v) units given by
and each winner will pay
for a total revenue of
Asymptotically, both 1 n x k n ,N n (v) and π k n ,N n (v) reach deterministic limits that depend on k and N . This reasoning leads to the following proposition (The proof is in the Appendix.):
That is, when the number of units k n and the number of bidders N n are large and k n ≤ N nF (v * ), the seller's revenue is given by X k n ,N n (v) = k n F −1 (1−k n /N n )+o(n). The limiting dynamic control problem can be formulated as:
which leads to the following "open-loop" formulation
since the number of units awarded is equal to min{k, NF (v * )}, it is sufficient to focus in allocations k that satisfy the constraint k ≤ NF (v * ). At every stage the auctioneer chooses the optimal number of units to award, k t , and this, in turn, uniquely determines the selling price
LPCC rule. For example, when bidders' valuations are uniformly distributed, the limiting dynamic program reduces to a concave quadratic maximization problem that is readily solvable.
Computing the LPCC solution
In general, the DP associated with the LPCC mechanism is solved using simulation. In some cases this can be avoided. Specifically, (12) can be written as
and then solved using standard numerical methods. Something similar can be done with (13): we can first optimize over the price s, and then find the best k for that s * . For a given k, let
Note that the objective of (15) is continuous in s, positive for all s ∈ (0, v) and zero when s = 0 or s = v. So, the maximum must lie in the interval (0,v).
The recursion at stage t then proceeds as follows: for each x we first compute the optimal price for a given k, and then search (at most C times) to find the best k. So, the algorithm requires roughly O(C 2 T ) calls to (15) . Depending on the length of the support of the distribution of the number of bidders N t , solving (15) may be "expensive" and simulation may become more efficient.
For the example with C = 100 and T = 10 this solution takes an order of 10 5 calculations of
, and the tables for the optimal s * t and k * t .
Numerical examples
We next consider some numerical examples. These examples illustrate the conditions under which an optimal pricing mechanism significantly outperforms LPCC. In every experiment that follows, the DP associated with the optimal mechanism was solved using simulation with 20 runs, each with 1000 samples in (N t , v) space, where the 20 outcomes were averaged to get estimates and confidence intervals of the expected revenue. In order to generate the descending uniform order statistics, we used the method described in Tadikamalla and Balakrishnan [21] . Bidders' valuations were assumed to be uniformly distributed. This assumption simplifies the analysis and did not appear to affect the nature of our results. The latter was tested by trying other candidates such as the truncated normal and exponential distributions. In the first two subsections the valuation distribution was uniform U (0, 1).
The effect of the concentration of bidders
In the first experiment, we studied how the revenue changes as we varied the concentration of bidders, defined as the number of bidders per period. We assume the seller starts with C = 10 units, and the total number of bidders in all periods is constant at 64. We then varied the number of periods from 1 to 64, so that the number of bidders per period varied. That is, the example run from 64 bidders in one period (high concentration of bidders) to one bidder in each of 64 consecutive periods (low concentration of bidders).
The results are summarized in Table 1 . The first observation is that the optimal revenue increases as the concentration of bidders increases. This is intuitive, since as the seller observes more bidders' valuations per period, she is making allocation decisions with reduced uncertainty about future bid values. Moreover, an increase in concentration creates more direct bidding competition among buyers. The gap between the two extreme cases is 4%, which by revenue management standards is a significant improvement.
As we have shown theoretically in Proposition 3, the LPCC mechanism is optimal when there is only one bidder per period. And in general it tends to perform well when there are few bidders in each period. As the number of bidders per period increases, however, the LPCC mechanism will "leave money on the table" so to speak, since many of the winners would have been willing to pay more than the reserve price to get their units. In essence, the LPCC mechanism fails to take advantage of the bidding competition created by aggregating buyers. 
The effect of demand and capacity values
The second experiment compares the expected revenue achieved under various levels of capacity and demand. The number of bidders per period was kept constant at 20. We studied three scenarios, where the number of periods was T = 1, 5 and 10; and for each of these consider three choices of capacity C = T, 5 T and 10 T . Results are shown in Tables 2-4 , with 95% CI's for the mean in the optimal case. The biggest suboptimality gaps for LPCC occur in the case where all buyers are concentrated in one period (Table 2) . This is consistent with the findings reported in Table 1 . Also, going from left to right in Tables 2-4 corresponds to lower ratios of demand-to-capacity. In all cases, the relative performance of LPCC improved as the demand-to-capacity ratio became smallest (far right column), though the improvement is not monotone in this ratio as shown by the middle columns of Tables 2-4 . The improvement seen in the last columns is expected since this approaches a case of more units than bidders, where Proposition 4 shows that LPCC is optimal.
Finally, the relative performance of LPCC improves as both the number of bidders and the capacity become large (e.g. Table 4 ). This is expected since LPCC is asymptotically optimal as C, N t ↑ ∞ and the auction design problem effectively reduces to a deterministic capacity allocation problem. In fact, evaluating the asymptotic expression for the value function given in (14), we get that the limiting performance in Table 3 would be respectively 4.75, 18.75 and 25; and in Table 4 , 9.5, 37.5 and 50. We also implemented the LPCC heuristic derived through (14) -which is very simple to compute; its performance is quite close to that of the exact LPCC. Next, we looked at the effect of different levels of variability in the buyer's valuations for items.
The effect of different levels of variability in buyers' valuations
Bidders' valuations were assumed to be uniformly distributed with mean 10. The variance of the valuations was changed by adjusting the range of the distribution (the "Min" and "Max" values in Table 5 ). There were T = 5 periods, N t = 10 bidders per period, and C = 10 units to sell.
Results are shown in Table 5 . The main observation is that the seller benefits from increased variability in bidders' valuations, as one might expect since the amount that high-value bidders are willing to pay increases. The performance improvement can be dramatic (of the order of 50%).
The suboptimality gap of LPCC increases as the variance in bidders' valuations increases. This suggests that an optimal mechanism is most beneficial in cases where there is a lot of heterogeneity in buyer valuations for a product. Using an optimal mechanism can produce performance improvements of order 2% or larger over LPCC, which is quite significant.
The effect of different levels of variability in the number of bidders
In our last experiment, we studied how the seller's optimal revenue is influenced by the level of Results are shown in Table 6 . The main observation is that as the variance in the number of bidders per period increases, the seller's revenue decreases under both the optimal and LPCC mechanisms. The relative deviation from optimality of LPCC increases with variance. Thus, increased uncertainty about the number of bidders seems to favor the use of an optimal mechanism. 
Conclusions
Our results on the optimal dynamic auction provide an important theoretical benchmark for evaluating traditional revenue management mechanisms (e.g. LPCC). The results also provide some valuable intuition into how to conduct a dynamic auction. In particular, that one should not be greedy about accepting bids in each period, but rather refuse bids that may be profitable in order to increase the equilibrium bids. The optimal auction also provides a feasible alternative to traditional pricing mechanisms such as LPCC. It is reasonably simple, at least in the second-price case, and optimal policies can be computed relatively efficiently. However, we also showed that in some important cases, LPCC is in fact optimal. These include the case where at most one bidder bids at a time, capacity is unconstrained, and situations in which the volume of bids and the amount of capacity sold is large.
In other scenarios, our numerical results illustrated that the optimal mechanism can produce significant performance improvements over LPCC. The main conclusions from our numerical work is that an optimal mechanism is especially beneficial in cases where 1) the concentration of bidders is high (i.e., many bidders per period), 2) the total number of bidders relative to capacity is moderate, 3) bidders exhibit a high degree of variability in their valuations for the items, and 4)
there is significant variability in the number of bidders the seller will face in each period.
As for additional work, we see several topics worthy of further study. One is to extend our analysis to the case where J(·) is not necessarily monotone; this was done in Myerson [16] and Maskin and Riley [10] in a single period setting. Another extension is to apply the same sort of analysis to a production-inventory setting where the firm controls how many units is willing to produce, stock for the next period, or offer through an auction in the current one. This is the topic of a forthcoming paper. Finally, it would be desirable to extend the model to allow buyers to select the period within which they will submit bids, or even allow them to bid in more than one round.
In this case, buyers' strategies become much more complicated than those presented here.
The LHS is decreasing in its argument, which implies that
However, this contradicts the optimality of p * (x). 2
Proof of Theorem 1
We prove that ∆V t (x) is decreasing in x by induction on t. For t = 0 the theorem trivially holds since V 0 (x) = 0 for all x. For period t−1, the inductive hypothesis (IH) is that ∆V t−1 (x) ≥ ∆V t−1 (x+ 1).
We will then show that if IH holds, then ∆V t (x) is decreasing as well.
To do so, fix the number of bidders n t and consider a given realization v = (v 1 , . . . , v n t ) of bidders's valuations. Note that max{
. Define the inner maximized value in (3) in terms of p as follows:
and define the difference function
Note that for random N t and v,
Thus, it suffices to establish that ∆H t (x, n t , v) is decreasing in x to prove that ∆V t (x) is decreasing in x. For notational simplicity, we henceforth suppress the arguments n t , v in ∆H t (x, n t , v) and simply use ∆H t (x).
Using (16) and Lemma 2, we make the following observations:
Consider now ∆H t (x + 1) and ∆H t (x). Given the different values that p * (x) and p * (x + 1) can take by Lemma 2,  there are four cases to analyze.
In this scenario,
From Lemma 2, p * (x + 1) = p * (x) = p * (x − 1) + 1. Thus,
(by optimality of p * (·))
From Lemma 2, p * (x + 1) = p * (x) + 1 and p * (x) = p * (x − 1) + 1. Then,
Note that p * (x + 1) = p * (x) + 1. So,
(by obs. 1)
Thus, ∆H t (x) and hence ∆V t (x) is decreasing as well, which completes the induction proof. 2
Proof of Theorem 2
As in Theorem 1, it suffices to prove the statement for a particular realization n t , v using (6).
Following the notation introduced in (16), and observations 1 and 2 in the proof of Theorem 1, we get that
and from the fact that ∆V t−1 (·) is decreasing, ∆H t (x) ≥ ∆V t−1 (x). The expectation operator will then preserve this property. 2
Proof of Proposition 2
The proof assumes that the seller can correctly invert the bids into values in order to implement the optimal allocation rule, and solves for the symmetric, equilibrium strategy B. Redefine the function p * (·) from Lemma 1 in terms of a value v:
v >v i }, and by convention,v 0 < 0 Let P (v) be the probability that a bidder with valuation v is among the winners. For N t = n,
Unconditioning on N t gives (11).
Letv ≡v 1 (i.e.,v is the threshold for the seller to accept the first bid). It follows that P (v) = 0,
It is also easy to check that P (v) is strictly increasing in v, ∀v ≤ v ≤v. This is done by rewriting (17) as
and noting that the first term is nondecreasing, and the second is strictly increasing. The expectation over N t preserves the monotonicity property. Finally, P (·) is not continuous in v.
The probability of winning jumps up at points where the allocation rule p * (v) increases by one more unit; this adds one more term in the sum in (11) . The set of discontinuity points is 
Differentiating with respect to v, we get that
Assume that the equilibrium strategyB(v i ) satisfies the first order condition
This simplifies the previous expression to the differential equation
The next step is to solve the differential equation forB. Integrating betweenv and v i , we obtain 4
Since dP (v)
which implies together with (20) thatB(v i ) < v i for all v i >v. Evaluating (19) at v = v i , and using the fact that Prob(v i ∈ D t (x)) = 0, we get that
SinceB(v i ) < v i , it follows thatB(v i ) is strictly increasing. Finally, integrating (20) by parts and using the fact that P (v) = 0 we get (10) .
To complete the definition of the bid function at points of discontinuity, we define B(v i ) as the left limit ofB(v i ) according to (10) .
The last step is to verify thatB(·) is indeed an equilibrium strategy. This is done by checking the condition that Π i (v i , v i ) > Π i (v, v i ), ∀v >v, v = v i . We first consider points of continuity.
Substituting (10) in (18) this is equivalent to 
Proof of Proposition 3
We will prove the result by showing that the two DP formulations are the same, for any period t.
For the LPCC setting, given that N t ≤ 1, the optimal number of units to offer is clearly k = 1.
The seller's problem in period t becomes 
The LPCC DP can then be written as 
while the DP recursion for the optimal mechanism follows from (6): The DP for the optimal mechanism then becomes:
Finally, from (22) , and comparing formulations (23) and (24), we conclude that the two procedures are equivalent. 2
Proof Proposition 5
Define the empirical distribution by F n (v) = Next, we analyze the asymptotic behavior of x k n ,N n (v). Since k ≤ N , we can assume that n is sufficiently large such that k n ≤ N n . Rewriting x k n ,N n (v) as
I{v i > max(v * , v (k n ) )}, and using the fact that F n converges to F we get that Similarly, F n (v (x k n ,N n (v)+1) ) = 1 − (x k n ,N n (v) + 1)/N n → 1 −F (v ∞ ) and |F n (v (x k n ,N n (v)+1) ) − F (v (x k n ,N n (v)+1) )| → 0. This implies that v (x k n ,N n (v)+1) → v ∞ , and in turn that π k n ,N n (v) → v ∞ , almost surely as n → ∞. Combining these results we complete the proof. 2
